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State and Local Taxation*
THEODORE F. BRILL**
This article surveys recent developments in the field of state
and local taxation. Particular emphasis is placed on the recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Florida in the area of corporate
taxation. The author also reports and analyzes developments in
property taxes, and sales and use taxes.
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I. REAL PROPERTY TAXES
A. Valuation
The Florida Constitution' requires property appraisers to assess
property within their jurisdictions at "just valuation.", This consti-
tutional provision has been implemented by the legislature through
a statute prescribing eight factors to be considered in computing
just valuation.3 These factors are: (1) the present cash value of the
property;4 (2) the present use of the property, and the highest and
* This article covers significant developments in legislation and in case law for 1977.
Attorney with the Office of Regional Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Miami,
Florida. All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 states that "[bly general law regulations shall be prescribed
which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation .... "
2. The term "just valuation" is synonymous for tax purposes with "full cash value."
McNayr v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
3. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1977).
4. In 1977, the legislature amended § 193.011 to define the present cash value of the
property as: "the amount a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller exclusive of reason-
able fees and costs of purchase, in cash or the immediate equivalent thereof in a transaction
at arm's length." 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-363 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 193.011(1) (1977)).
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best use to which the property could be expected to be put in the
immediate future; (3) the location of the property; (4) the quantity
or size of the property; (5) the cost of the property and the present
replacement value of any improvements thereon; (6) the condition
of the property; (7) the income from the property; and (8) the net
proceeds from the sale of the property.
The question concerning the proper valuation of real property
probably arises more frequently than any other in the state and local
tax area. The statute itself provides one reason for this mass of
litigation. Although it requires the appraiser to consider each factor,
the statute does not assign a relative weight to any of them. Further-
more, in specific cases it is arguable that the assessor overvalued,
undervalued or completely ignored a particular factor.
Section 194.042 of the Florida Statutes (1975) provided an op-
tion for the taxpayer to contest an assessment which he believed was
inaccurate. This provision was commonly referred to as Pope's Law.
The constitutionality of Pope's Law was challenged in ITT Com-
munity Development Corp. v. Seay5 on the ground that it violated
the just valuation requirement of the constitution.
Pope's Law provided a procedure by which the taxpayer could
offer his property for sale at. public auction to determine proper
valuation for tax purposes. Asthe Supreme Court of Florida noted,
"[t]he property owner who contests the assessment though Pope's
Law is required to make a commitment to his difference of opinion
[with the property appraiser] by testing that opinion at the mar-
ketplace."' The property in question went through an auction proce-
dure. The owner filed a certificate stating the amount he ascer-
tained to be the just valuation of his property. It was accompanied
by a surety bond for ten percent of the value of the property stated
in the certificate. The amount stated in the certificate constituted
the minimum bid that the property appraiser could accept at the
auction. If no bid was made exceeding the amount set forth in the
certificate, such amount would constitute the just valuation of the
property and would be entered on the tax rolls of the county.' If a
bid was accepted at auction, however, the valuation of the property
would be that which was originally assigned by the property ap-
praiser.8
In ITT Community Development Corp. v. Seay the taxpayer
attempted to utilize Pope's Law, contending that the 1975 tax no-
5. 347 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1977).
6. Id. at 1026.
7. FLA. STAT. § 194.042 (1977).
8. ITT Development Corp. v. Seay, 347 So. 2d at 1028.
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tices it received reflected wrongly increased assessments.9 The
owner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require the appraiser
to divide the taxpayer's holdings into parcels having a value of
$200,000 or less because, according to the taxpayer's interpretation
of Pope's Law, no certificate could contain property in excess of
$200,000 in assessed value. The appraiser denied having the duty to
divide land into $200,000 blocks. Additionally, the appraiser con-
tended that the certificates were not subject to the $200,000 limita-
tion unless they were composed of more than one parcel of land.
The trial court found that Pope's Law was unconstitutional
(although this was not challenged by the appraiser), that the tax-
payer was time-barred from using Pope's Law, and that the $200,000
limitation applied only when two or more parcels were included in
a single certificate. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial
court's finding that Pope's Law was unconstitutional, obviating the
need to address the taxpayer's last two points.'"
The supreme court found Pope's Law to be unconstitutional
because it failed to satisfy the just valuation requirement of the
Florida Constitution." Since Pope's Law measured just valuation in
terms of fair market value, it could only be upheld if it always
yielded valid fair market values. The court noted that fair market
value traditionally has been defined as that amount which a pur-
chaser, willing but not obligated to buy, would pay to one willing
but not obligated to sell. Although the parties could not initially be
compelled to buy and sell, the implication behind the traditional
definition is that once the parties enter into a contract of sale they
are bound. In contrast to the traditional situation, the court found
that under Pope's Law there never would be a willing buyer and a
willing seller because the taxpayer is not compelled to relinquish his
property to the highest bidder, and prospective buyers would tend
to be somewhat apathetic since the sale would remain contingent
upon the owner's willingness to sell, which might remain in question
for at least thirty days after the auction. Since Pope's Law did not
produce the necessary willing buyer and willing seller, it could not
yield a valid fair market value. The court, therefore, found that
Pope's Law did not provide just valuation. 2
Justice Adkins, however, stated in his dissent that an owner,
9. The taxpayer did not fill out the certificate required by § 194.042(1)(b). The
mandamus route was utilized to require the appraiser to divide the property into $200,000
parcels prior to the holding of an auction. Id. at 1026.
10. Id.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. 347 So. 2d at 1026-28 (citing FLA. STAT. § 194.042(1)(e) & (i) (1975)).
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following the procedure of Pope's Law, would become a willing seller
because the decision to follow the law was purely voluntary. Fur-
thermore, since no one was forced to buy, Adkins would find that
the buyer was a willing buyer. Adkins' contention does not respond
to the majority opinion's concern that purchasers would be discour-
aged from pursuing property because the seller need not accept the
buyer's offer. Adkins argued that the eight factors prescribed in
section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes (1975) for use in determining
just value were "artificial means" which the legislature designed
to measure the amount a willing buyer would pay a willing seller
for the property. 3
The supreme court in ITT found other infirmities with the stat-
ute. First, the court found that the statute interfered with the estab-
lishment of just valuation in a second way. The statute does not
provide for the use on the tax roll of any cash offer greater than the
amount enumerated in the certificate, even if an actual sale takes
place at that price. Only when there is no cash offer above the
certificate amount is a value established which varies from that
originally assigned by the property appraiser.
Second, the court found that as a result of the auction proce-
dure, the statute attempted to value property at least ten months
after the legal assessment valuation date 4 of the tax year." The
court found this result constitutionally impermissible since it meant
that all taxpayers would not be treated consistently.
Finally, the court found that the $200,000 statutory limitation
would yield an unreasonable result regardless of how it was con-
strued. The court stated that if the limitation applied only when
there were two or more parcels of property included in a single
assessment, a problem would still arise when a single parcel carried
a high value. In such a situation, the taxpayer would be motivated
to set an arbitrary value on his parcel which was less than its true
value. Since few persons would possess the financial resources nec-
essary to enable them to bid on such expensive property, the tax-
payer would be virtually assured of having his own valuation ac-
cepted. Conversely, if the $200,000 limitation were construed to
mean that all property must be divided into parcels valued at less
than $200,000, then any single improvement of a parcel valued in
excess of $200,000 would bar its owner from utilizing Pope's Law."6
13. Id. at 1030.
14. The legal assessment valuation date is January 1.
15. The court cited Culbertson v. State Road Dept., 165 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964),
for the proposition that appraisals quickly become too remote in time to serve as a competent
basis for determining value.
16. For example, any high rise office or residential building constructed on one parcel
1216 [Vol. 32:1213
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B. Agricultural Exemptions
1. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
In examining statutorily defined procedures and deadlines, it
is clear that the Florida courts strictly construe the statutes to the
benefit of the taxing authority. Given the previous case law regard-
ing due process and notice requirements, it is not surprising that the
district courts of appeal in several recent cases found that the tax-
payers could not sustain their burden of showing strict compliance
with the agricultural classification statute.
In Blake v. R. M.S. Holding Corp., 7 the taxpayer bought prop-
erty in January 1974, from an owner who had an agricultural exemp-
tion for the property in question. A few days after the closing, the
previous owner received a short form renewal card for his use in
applying for an agricultural assessment, but having sold the prop-
erty, the previous owner forwarded the application form to the attor-
ney for the new owner. On January 31, 1974, the plaintiff's attorney
sent a letter with the short renewal form made out as an application
on behalf of the new owner for an agricultural assessment of the
property for the 1974 tax year. Because of a clerical error, the letter
was addressed to the assessor at the Dade County Court House
instead of the assessor's office at the Justice Building. Conse-
quently, the letter was not delivered to the assessor's office. The
property was assessed and taxed for 1974 as nonagricultural. A letter
mailed by the taxpayer's attorney on December 27, 1974, was re-
ceived by the tax assessor's office which responded on January 3,
1975, that no application had been filed for 1974."s
In R.M.S. Holding Corp., the court construed section 193.461
of the Florida Statutes (1973) to require the taxpayer to apply for
an agricultural classification prior to April 1.19 When such an appli-
cation is not filed, the land must be assessed under the provisions
of section 193.011 of the Florida Statutes (1975).1° The court held
that since no application had been filed with the assessor by April
that exceeds $200,000 in value could not be divided by floor or other device to obtain $200,000
increments. 347 So. 2d at 1029.
17. 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
18. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(a) (1973) provided that "[n]o lands shall be classified as
agricultural lands unless a return is filed on or before April 1 of each year . . . . Failure to
make timely application by April 1 shall constitute a waiver for one year of the . . . agricul-
tural assessment."
19. The legislature has amended the statute to require the filing of an application by
March 1. In addition, the "Board of Tax Adjustment" is now referred to as the "Property
Appraisal Adjustment Board." 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-234 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
193.461(3) (1977)).
20. 341 So. 2d at 799 (citing FLA. STAT. § 193.461(6)(b) (1973)).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
1, in the sense that the document was delivered to or received at the
office of the assessor, no proper return had been made. The court
also found that the mailing of an application which was addressed
incorrectly and not received by the assessor's office, did not fulfill
the statutory requirement for the filing of a return or application
with the assessor." Furthermore, the court decided that a short form
renewal application was not a proper application by a new owner
since only a prior owner could use a renewal application.
Section 193.461 again was strictly construed in Doyle v.
Askew." The question presented was whether applications for agri-
cultural assessment could be filed after April 1, if the taxpayer's
failure was due to illness or other such cause. The court held that
such a cause was not a proper excuse since the statute was manda-
tory. The court concluded that the failure to make a timely applica-
tion constituted a waiver of any application for agricultural assess-
ment.
2. GOOD FAITH COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL USE
The key to the entire agricultural exemption framework lies in
its use by property owners to shield property being held for future
development from the property taxes which would be a reflection of
the land's true value.2" In fact, where land is being used for its
highest and best possible use and that use is agriculture, the agricul-
tural exemption statute does not provide any benefits to the land
owner, since the statute only provides that such land be assessed on
the basis of its value for agricultural use.2"
In several cases this year, the District Courts of Appeal for the
Second and Fourth Districts have disagreed on what constitutes a
21. The court pointed out that the assessor did not have to notify the taxpayer that its
agricultural exemption had been denied because no application had been received. Further-
more, the court stated that even when a properly filed application is not granted the assessor
is not statutorily required to inform the applicant. 341 So. 2d at 800.
The only requirement for notification is that the assessor must maintain public records
in his office showing valuation and whether an agricultural assessment has been granted. Id.
(citing FLA. STAT. § 193.461(2) (1973)).
22. 341 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
23. See Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1976).
24. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1977). Subsection (3) of the statute lists the factors the tax
assessor may consider when deciding if the property qualifies for an agricultural tax exemp-
tion. These factors are: (1) the length of time the land has been used agriculturally; (2) the
continuity of the use; (3) the purchase price paid; (4) size as it relates to agricultural use;
(5) extent of commercial agricultural practices; (6) existence of a lease and the nature of
it; and (7) other factors that may become applicable. The supreme court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the statute in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla.
1976). See Brill & Hayes, State and Local Taxation, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31
U. MiAMI L. REV. 1231, 1242-43 (1977).
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good faith commercial agricultural use. The Second District has
held that a good faith use exists when the agricultural use yields
sufficient income to allow the use to stand on its own feet. The
agricultural use need not provide a profit on the total investment.
Conversely, the Fourth District has decided that there must be a
reasonable expectation of meeting the investment cost and realizing
a reasonable profit in order for an agricultural use to be considered
a good faith commercial agricultural use.
In Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc. 5 the Second
District found that profit motive was an appropriate criterion to
help determine whether there is good faith commercial agricultural
use. The court stated that the profit motive criterion does not re-
quire that the profit be sought immediately on the total investment.
Regardless of whether the purchase price contemplated speculative
or other nonagricultural uses, the statute is satisfied if the land
presently has a bona fide commercial agricultural use. Furthermore,
the court indicated that an agricultural exemption may be granted
despite the absence of a reasonable return on the total investment
via agricultural use.
The Second District found that the purpose of the agricultural
exemption statute was to encourage agricultural use by assisting the
farmer to make a reasonable profit from its use. Accordingly, the
court found that although the agricultural use was a temporary use
for the purpose of sustaining the investment until the full specula-
tive profit could be realized, it was not any less a legislatively en-
couraged use.
In Walden v. Tuten,8 the Second District noted that a profit
motive was an important element in showing good faith commercial
agricultural use. The court stated that, absent a profit motive from
the agricultural use, the presumption of a non-bona fide agricultural
use, arising from a sale for three times the assessed agricultural
value, would tend to be "fortified."" The court found that the prop-
erty owners received an annual return of only one-ninth of one per-
cent on their investment. 8 The court remanded the case, holding
that the critical question in determining if the good faith commer-
cial agricultural standard was satisfied was whether the lessees, who
were the actual agricultural users, were materially profiting from
their agricultural use. 9 The court noted that if there were a profit
25. 347 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
26. 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
27. Id. at 131.
28. The return on the investment was $1,300 on the $1,000,250 purchase.
29. Tuten relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Straughn v. K & K Land
19781
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from the property, the land trust's status as a passive land trust
would be jeopardized for federal tax purposes. The court, therefore,
should have considered this factor as mitigating the importance of
finding a profit motive since making a profit actually could be very
expensive for the beneficiaries of the trust.
The Fourth District strictly construed the agricultural exemp-
tion statute against the taxpayer in First National Bank of Holly-
wood v. Markham ° and Markham v. Nationwide Development Co.31
First National presented a situation where there had been no in-
come from agriculture for the year in question, although there was
testimony that the expected income from agriculture for the subse-
quent year would be approximately $87,000. Other evidence showed
that for the tax year in question, the expenses of the property ex-
ceeded $250,000 of which approximately eighty percent was for in-
terest. Furthermore, for the following tax year, interest alone would
total $600,000, approximately seven times the expected income from
agriculture. The taxpayer relied in large part on the fact that the
land prior to his acquisition had been used as a dairy farm and that
the land still was being used for agricultural purposes. The court
concluded that in view of the purchase price of the land, the differ-
ence between the income derived from the agricultural use and the
cost of owning the land, and the announced purpose of the beneficial
owner to hold the land for resale as an investment, the possibility
of a good faith commercial agricultural use could be ruled out.
Nationwide was similar in that the previous owners of the prop-
erty maintained the right, for no additional rent, to remain in pos-
session of the property, which they did for the first four months of
the tax year in question. The court held that although the previous
owners continued their dairy operation, this did not enable the
taxpayer to satisfy the good faith use standard. The court reasoned
that there could not be a good faith commercial agricultural opera-
tion because Nationwide had no reasonable expectation of meeting
investment costs and realizing a reasonable profit through the agri-
cultural use of the land. It would seem, however, that if the motive
of the statute is to be served an exemption should have been
granted here. Since all the cases involve situations where the land
is not being put to its highest and best use, a use which has re-
Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976). There, the supreme court stated that "[tihe
agricultural assessed value is the amount that could be invested with a reasonable expecta-
tion of an annual return to the owner similar to what he would gain from other [similar]
commercial enterprises . .. ."
30. 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
31. 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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mained the same in scope and extent should be sufficient to satisfy
the good faith commercial agricultural use standard.
3. VALUATION
Cassady v. McKinney" dealt with the information a trial court
must have in order to make its own valuation of the property after
an improper assessment. Apparently, this was the second time the
same case had been reversed for the appraiser's failure to consider
two of the seven use factors mandated by the legislature in section
193.461(6) of the Florida Statutes (1971).11 The evidence before the
trial court clearly established that the consideration of the two omit-
ted factors would result in reducing the assessed value of the land."
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, found that the trial
court, lacking competent substantial evidence of the depreciated
value of improvements on the property and of the lower level of
income produced by the property, had insufficient information to
make a proper adjustment. The court held that a trial court was free
to accept competent evidence revealing the manner and extent to
which the omitted factors bore upon the valuation. In the absence
of such evidence, however, a trial court could not substitute its own
judgment as to the extent of the adjustment.
Judge McNulty, concurring specially, argued that even if there
were sufficient evidence to which the trial judge could point in mak-
ing an assessment, he did not have the authority to do so. The judge
stated that a court might determine a given assessment to be legally
excessive and set a cap on it, but it should then remand the matter
to the assessor to make the assessment. Apparently, the judge be-
lieved that without such a prohibition aggrieved taxpayers would
have nothing to lose by trying to persuade a circuit judge to adopt
the taxpayer's own valuation. 5
C. Leaseholds
1. SUBSURFACE RIGHTS
The pressing question of whether a lease giving the lessee the
right to explore and extract minerals, oil, and gas from the property
32. 343 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
33. The factors that were not considered were the present depreciated value of improve-
ments on the property and the income produced by the property. Id, at 956. The present
depreciated value of improvements factor was eliminated by the legislature in 1972. 1972 Fla.
Laws, ch. 72-181, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1977)).
34. 343 So. 2d at 956.
35. Id. at 958.
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is taxable interest was resolved in Straughn v. Sun Oil Co. 6 The
supreme court held that such subsurface rights were taxable inter-
ests in real property.
The question of the taxability of subsurface interests was not
one involving the constitutional power of the state to tax.3" Rather,
the issue was "whether under the statute the leasehold interests are
interests in real property which the legislature intended should be
subject to taxation.""
The District Courts of Appeal for the First and Second Districts
had considered the subsurface rights issue in Fisher v. Sun Oil Co.3"
and Straughn v. Amoco Production Co.,40 respectively, and the
courts reached opposite conclusions on the issue.4
The First District in Fisher found that the legislative intent to
tax the taxpayer's leasehold interest could not be discerned from the
statute, and that under previous case law42 the interest possessed by
the taxpayer was no more than a contractual license to explore and
produce, rather than an interest in real property, hence, not one
subject to real property taxes.
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that at the time of Miller
v. Carr, section 193.481(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975) had not
been enacted. The supreme court followed the Second District's
distinction in noting that in Miller v. Carr the supreme court was
concerned "only with the alienability by the lessor of a reserved
interest in the unsevered oil," while the cases under the statute in
question were concerned with "the taxability of the total interest in
the lessee .... 43
36. 345 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1977).
37. The oil companies suing in Straughn v. Sun Oil Co. conceded that the legislature
has the inherent power to define real property for tax purposes.
38. 345 So. 2d at 1065. Section 193.481(1) of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides that:
Whenever the mineral, oil, gas, and other subsurface rights in or to real property
in this state shall have been sold or otherwise transferred by the owner of such
real property . . . . such subsurface rights shall be taken and treated as an
interest in real property subject to taxation separate and apart from the fee or
ownership of the fee or other interest in the fee.
39. 330 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), rev'd sub. nom. Straughn v. Sun Oil Co., 345 So.
2d 1062 (Fla. 1977).
40. 309 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), aff'd sub. nom. Straughn v. Sun Oil, 345 So. 2d
1062 (Fla. 1977).
41. These cases were discussed extensively in Brill & Hayes, supra note 24, at 1252-56.
42. Miller v. Carr, 141 Fla. 318, 193 So. 45 (1940).
43. 345 So. 2d 1062, 1064-65 (quoting Straughn v. Amoco Prod. Co., 309 So. 2d 39, 41
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
Rather than distinguishing Miller, it is submitted that the supreme court should have
discredited the language used by that court. In the Miller case the lessee contended that the
lease constituted a "constructive severance of oil 'in place' and that title to the oil passed to
the lessee. ... 141 Fla. at 324, 193 So. at 47. The Miller court construed the lease to be a
[Vol. 32:12131222
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The Supreme Court of Florida conceded that the statute was
unclear on its face as to its purpose. Nevertheless, the court found
that the purpose the legislature intended the statute to have was
clear. The court reasoned that there was little difference whether
the rights to subsurface minerals are transferred by deed or lease,
since in either case the taxpayer can extract the minerals and be-
come the true owner of the separate minerals. The court concluded,
accordingly, that it was "only just that the tax burden generated by
subsurface mineral rights fall on those who benefit from possession
of those rights."" The court believed this consideration was the
motivating force behind the legislature's enactment.
Justice Drew argued in his dissent that the legislature did not
intend to tax the mineral leases. He reasoned that the words
"otherwise transferred" indicated "an intention to tax only an inter-
est in real estate that would be susceptible to intelligent and uni-
form appraisal, levy and enforcement. . . ."I' Section 211.13 of the
Florida Statutes (1977) states that it is impossible under known
valuation methods to ascertain accurately the value of subsurface
rights. Justice Drew, therefore, argued that the legislature, when it
enacted section 211.13,46 could not have intended to tax such inter-
ests. Justice Drew would find the leases to be no more than contrac-
tual licenses to explore and to produce.
2. VALUATION
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Florida in Williams v. Jones7
upheld the constitutionality of section 196.199 of the Florida Stat-
utes (Supp. 1976) which provides for the exemption of certain
"contract for the use of the realty for the purposes therein specified. It passed the right to
produce oil from the land and nothing more." Id. Both the Second District in Amoco Produc-
tion Co., and the supreme court, in Straughn v. Sun Oil Co., correctly observed that Miller
was concerned with the alienability of a leasehold interest and not its taxability. Both courts,
however, ignored Miller's limitation of a leasehold interest in subsurface rights to a mere
"right to produce." In order for the tax to be levied on the leasehold interest, the leasehold
interest must be found to be an interest in realty. See Brill & Hayes, supra note 24, at 1253
n.142.
In Straughn v. Sun Oil Co. the supreme court took pains to point out that a leasehold
interest is an interest in realty. The court cited its earlier decision in Williams v. Jones, 326
So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 428 U.S. 803 (1976), in support of that proposition.
It also could have cited its decisions in Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
275 So. 2d 505, 509 n.2 (Fla. 1973), and Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla.
1957). Though each of these decisions contradict the effect of the Miller language, none of
the decisions discussed Miller.
44. 345 So. 2d at 1065.
45. Id.
46. 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 22-784, § 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 221.13 (1977)).
47. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
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governmental-owned property and for methods of valuing such
leases. Section 196.199(6) stated that property "originally leased for
99 years or more. . . shall be deemed to be owned. . . ." Williams
v. Jones found that this subsection dealing with the ninety-nine
year leases was intended by the legislature to provide a standard for
valuation.' s
In Department of Revenue v. Gibbs,49 the county tax collector
attempted to collect delinquent taxes on leasehold interests in
government-owned property by issuing tax sales certificates on the
property. The State Department of Revenue sued to enjoin the issu-
ance of such certificates, contending that the exclusive procedure
for the collection of unpaid taxes on leasehold interests in govern-
ment property is provided by sections 196.199(7) and 197.116(7) of
the Florida Statutes (1975). Section 196.116(7) states that no certifi-
cate should be sold nor a lien created in property owned by any
governmental entity whose property became subject to taxation due
to its lease to a non-governmental party. The statute added that
such delinquent taxes should be enforced and collected pursuant to
section 196.199(7). The tax collector had contended that since the
ninety-nine year leases were to be valued and treated as fee owner-
ship, the taxes thereon could be collected under section 197.116 by
the sale of tax certificates on the leasehold interests just as tax
certificates are sold for unpaid taxes on fee interests. The court
disagreed with the tax collector's contention that section
196.199(7)(1) only applied to leasehold interests of less than ninety-
nine years duration.
II. INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES
A. Procedure
Section 199.232(4) of the Florida Statutes (1971) provided that
no intangible tax "assessment shall be made, except pursuant to an
investigation, after the expiration of three years from the date of
filing, whichever is later." In Grunwald v. Department of Revenue,"
the taxpayer filed his return on March 20, 1970. The due date of the
return was April 1, 1970. On November 30, 1970, the taxpayer paid
the intangible taxes which were due. Prior to November 30, 1973,
the Department of Revenue notified the taxpayer that it was inves-
tigating his liability for the 1970 tax year. Sections 199.252 and
215.26 of the Florida Statutes (1973) state that the right of refund
48. For further discussion of Williams v. Jones, see Brill & Hayes, supra note 24, at 1256.
49. 342 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
50. 343 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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for intangible taxes is available for three years from the date of
payment. Section 199.232(7) provides that an investigation of intan-
gible tax liability may be made against any person for any year for
which his right to refund is available. Accordingly, the disposition
of the case hinged on an interpretation of section 199.232(4), which
provided that no assessment could be made "except pursuant to an
investigation" after the three year period expires. The court held
that the investigation provision was not a limitation on the power
of the assessor to make an assessment against the taxpayer. The
court enlarged the three year provision so that any assessment
would be proper so long as the investigation had begun within the
three year limitation for refund.
B. Scope
Since the passage of the documentary stamp tax, there has
been considerable litigation concerning what suffices as a transfer
having a taxable incident. In 1976, the Supreme Court of Florida
attempted to provide some certainty in this area when it decided
Florida Department of Revenue v. DeMaria," which held that a
taxable incident occurs where the economic burden (in this case
mortgage payments) is shifted from the corporate transferor to the
sole shareholder-transferee. Two recent cases distinguished
DeMaria by finding the absence of a shift of the economic burden.
In Abramson v. Straughn,2 the taxpayer had participated in a
joint venture with an individual who subsequently fell into bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In order to extricate the taxpayer's fifty percent
interest in the venture from the bankruptcy proceedings and the
claims of the bankrupt's creditors, the two venturers reached an
agreement, approved by the court, whereby each received parcels of
property consistent with his fifty percent interest and assumed the
mortgage thereon. Quitclaim deeds were executed by the venturer
in bankruptcy for nominal consideration. The court found that the
transaction only changed the form of the taxpayer's liability and
that this change did not constitute consideration for documentary
stamp tax purposes. The court pointed out that DeMaria and an
earlier case, Kendall House Apartments v. Department of Reve-
nue,53 dealt with the shift of an economic burden from a grantor,
solely responsible for mortgage payments, to a grantee who pre-
viously did not have a financial obligation.5 The court concluded
51. 338 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
52. 348 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
53. 245 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1971).
54. For a discussion of these cases, see Brill & Hayes, supra note 24, at 1274-77.
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that since the extent of the taxpayer's liability remained un-
changed, he did not purchase the fifty percent interest for con-
sideration within the meaning of section 201.02 of the Florida
Statutes (1975), and thus there was no taxable incident.
55
In American Foam Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,5"
a corporation entered into a contract for the purchase of certain
property for which it advanced funds although title was placed in
the name of its sole stockholder. Although payments on the mort-
gage were made by the corporation, a subsequent construction loan
was backed by a note signed by the sole stockholder in his personal
capacity. The stockholder later executed a quitclaim deed to the
corporation without consideration, but subject to the outstanding
mortgage securing the sole stockholder's personal note. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, found that the responsibility and
economic burden for making the mortgage payments always had
remained with the corporation. It reasoned that since the corpora-
tion had made all the payments on the purchase money order and
no payments had been made by the individual, it was clear that
there had been no consideration and this was merely a transfer from
agent to principal; therefore, the case was an exempt transaction
under the Department of Revenue's own rules. 7
A last case concerning the scope of the documentary stamp tax
dealt with the question of what the actual purchase price of a prop-
erty is for tax purposes. In Department of Revenue v. Mesmer,58 the
taxpayers had entered into a contract for the purchase of real prop-
erty at an agreed price of $1,300,000. Prior to closing, the taxpayers
sold their rights in the property to a third party for $1,850,000.
Subsequently, the third party closed the sale by paying the seller
the $1,300,000 contract price. Documentary stamp taxes were paid
only on the transaction, reflecting the $1,300,000 paid to the pur-
chaser for the legal title under the contract, while the department
contended that tax was due on the entire $3,150,000, which the
purchaser paid the taxpayers and the seller.
The trial court found that the doctrine of equitable conversion
was not applicable here and therefore did not make the transaction
between the taxpayers and the third party a taxable one.59 This
finding was reversed on appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First
55. 348 So. 2d at 1174.
56. 345 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
57. FLA. ADM1N. CODE § 12A-4.14 (1973).
58. 345 So. 2d 384 (Fla. lt Dist. 1977).
59. For a discussion of the doctrine of equitable conversion in Florida, see Hull v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 79 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1954).
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District, finding that the assignment of the contract immediately
vested equitable title in the third party, although legal title re-
mained in the seller until conveyance. The court concluded that
documentary stamp taxes reflecting the price of the assignment by
the taxpayers to the third party should have been paid because
there had been a transfer of an interest in land within the contem-
plation of section 201.02 of the Florida Statutes (1975).60
C. Interest
In Lewis v. Creative Developers Ltd.,' the District Court of
Appeal, First District, considered the effective date of section
201.17(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1976) providing for the pay-
ment of interest on unpaid documentary stamps at the rate of one
percent per month from the date of recording. Although the statute
became effective on June 28, 1976, the supreme court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether the statute was applicable to certain
transactions under consideration in Florida Department of Revenue
v. DeMaria.62 The District Court of Appeal, First District, had
stayed the action in Creative Developers until the Supreme Court
of Florida decided the DeMaria case. The court found that since
there was no language in the statute stating that it was to be applied
retroactively as to the payment of interest, it should not apply to
taxes which were delinquent at the time of the statute's enactment.
III. SALES AND USE TAXES
A. Extent of Power
Chapter 212 of the Florida Statutes (1977) prescribes sales and
use taxes. Section 212.06(5)," as does the Constitution of the United
States,6" excepts all imports and exports from the application of
these taxes. Section 212.06(5) was construed very broadly in Fred
McGilvray, Inc. v. Askew. 5 McGilvray held constitutional the sta-
tutory presumption that goods cannot be considered exports unless
they are delivered to a licensed exporter for exporting, delivered to
a common carrier for shipment out of state or mailed through
United States mails out of the state."
60. 345 So. 2d at 386.
61. 350 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
62. 338 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
63. FLA. STAT. § 212.06(5) (1977).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.2.
65. 340 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1976).
66. For a critical examination of the McGilvray case, see Brill & Hayes, supra note 24,
at 1267-68.
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A question concerning the phrase property delivered "to a li-
censed exporter for exporting" 7 arose in Graybar Electric Co. v.
Department of Revenue."5 The problem arose when the taxpayer
sold electrical equipment to two foreign customers through their
subsidiaries formed in Florida for exporting purposes. The state had
issued export sales tax numbers to the subsidiaries. No other proce-
dures existed by which the subsidiaries could become licensed ex-
porters." The state assessed a sales tax on the taxpayer's sales be-
cause the taxpayer could not qualify under any of the three excep-
tions, including the licensed exporter provision.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, found that in the
absence of formal state export licensing procedures, the sales tax
was unauthorized because the goods were delivered to a "licensed
exporter" within the meaning of that exception. The court reasoned
that since the state had issued export sales tax numbers to the
subsidiaries and there was no other procedure by which the compa-
nies could have become licensed exporters as contemplated by the
statute, the property in question should not be subject to sales
taxes.70
Klosters Rederi A/S v. Department of Revenue7' presented to
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, another question in-
volving the scope of chapter 212 of the Florida Statutes (1977).72 A
Norwegian corporation was assessed on purchases of supplies to be
used on cruises it conducted outside the state's territorial waters.
The state contended that the placement of the items on board the
cruise vessel for use during the voyage was a sufficient exercise of
power over personal property to make the items amenable to the
assessment of use taxes.
Section 212.08(8) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides for a
partial exemption for vessels engaged in intrastate or foreign com-
merce. The tax exemption is applicable to the vessels and parts
thereof and is apportioned by the ratio of the vessel's intrastate
mileage as compared to its total mileage. 73 The court found that the
taxed items such as toiletries and party supplies were expendable
67. FLA. STAT. § 212.06(5)(a) (1977).
68. 347 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
69. Id. at 719.
70. Id. at 720.
71. 348 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
72. FLA. STAT. § 213.05(2) (1977) sets the use tax rate at four percent when an item "is
not sold but is used, consumed, distributed or stored for use or consumption in [Florida]."
73. The state conceded that if there were a finding that the items were parts, the formula
would result in only a negligible tax, since there were few miles traveled within the State of
Florida. 348 So. 2d 656, 659 n.1.
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and did not qualify as parts. The court found, however, that the
expendable items in question could be taxed only on a pro rata basis
as to the intrastate use.74
B. Estoppel
In 1968 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
the admissions tax laws did not apply to operations basically identi-
cal to those of the taxpayer in the case at hand. The state "made it
plain" that it would not "attempt to enforce collection of any admis-
sions tax . . . -.1 The taxpayer then ceased collection of the tax.
Subsequent case law resulted in the upholding of the admissions tax
and the taxpayer thereafter began paying taxes. George W Davis
& Sons, Inc. v. Askew"5 arose from the attempt of the state to tax
the taxpayer on its admissions sales which had accrued during the
time the admissions tax seemingly was inapplicable.
The First District, although noting that a state is not estopped
from assessing back taxes due to an error by its officials, found a
different case here. The court found it unfair to force the taxpayer,
who was really a collection agency for the state, to pay back taxes
after it had followed the existing case law with the Department of
Revenue's approval.
IV. CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
Probably the most significant case in state and local taxation
during 1977 in terms of legal reasoning and potential economic im-
pact was Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc." In
November 1971, the Florida Constitution was amended to permit
the imposition of a corporate income tax.7 8 The taxpayers brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief for capital gains
which they had as a result of the appreciation of their real estate
prior to November 1971, the date constitutional protection from
taxation was ended. The taxpayers' argument apparently was prem-
ised on the concept that the appreciation in the value of their
74. The court found that this holding was necessary under FLA. ADMiN. CODE § 12A-
1.64(5)(c) (1977).
75. George W. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Askew, 343 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977)
(quoting the trial court's opinion).
76. 343 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
77. 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977).
78. 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-984, § 1. By referendum the voters of Florida repealed the
constitutional bar on income taxes for other than natural persons. This provision was not self-
executing but the legislature took the necessary implementing action. The corporate income
tax now is specified in FLA. STAT. §§ 220.01-.69 (1977).
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property was income. The trial court agreed, holding that
"[aippreciation in the value of property which occured prior [to
1971] continues to be constitutionally protected from taxation as
income.""9
The Supreme Court of Florida held that appreciation does not
become income until the property is sold, exchanged, or otherwise
disposed, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Eisner v. Macomber."0 Eisner held that income is neither
a gain accruing to capital nor a growth in the value of an invest-
ment; rather income is something of value severed from the capi-
tal.8' The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that Eisner had
been developed to include several items as realized income."2 The
court distinguished these taxable incidents because economic gain
was enjoyed at the time of the taxable event.
The thrust of the taxpayers' argument in Leadership Housing
really seemed to be that the appreciation of their capital assets was
immune from taxation because of the existing Florida constitutional
provision prohibiting the taxation of income. The supreme court did
not respond to this argument, apparently feeling it was indistin-
guishable from the question of whether appreciation is income.
The majority opinion of the supreme court found without merit
the taxpayers' second point, that the tax would be harsh and arbi-
trary. Justice Roberts in his dissent, however, analyzed the question
in terms of its historical perspective. Roberts pointed out that the
constitutional prohibition was adopted during the boom period in
Florida to create a favorable investment climate. Roberts con-
cluded, accordingly, that the taxation of the pre-1971 appreciation
was impermissible in view of the 1924 income tax prohibition. The
Justice argued that "Florida taxpayers were entitled to rely upon a
constitutional immunization of capital gains from a state income
tax which was adopted for the very purpose of encouraging them to
invest their capital in this state."8 Robert's argument could be
made any time the status of an item was changed from nontaxable
to taxable. What makes his contention compelling, however, is that
a taxpayer owning real property in or after 1971, which appreciated
during the prior thirty-seven years, finds himself in the untenable
79. 343 So. 2d at 613.
80. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
81. Id. at 207.
82. 343 So. 2d at 614. These items include the value of lessee-erected improvements in
realty upon reversion to the owner, detached interest coupons of bonds upon a gift, and
property transferred by a husband to his wife in a property settlement connected with divorce.
83. 343 So. 2d at 620.
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position of owning property with a potentally huge and unexpected
tax bill. The majority opinion's interpretation is troublesome be-
cause it really seems like a retroactive tax in that the state is at-
tempting to make a killing all at once on revenue it was barred from
taking.
